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Larry Laudan

Current Position: Senior Investigator, Instituto de las Investigaciones Filosoficas, National Autonomous University of Mexico

Degrees: B.A. in physics, University of Kansas, 1962. Ph.D. in philosophy, Princeton University, 1965.

Curriculum Vitae


Progress and Its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Buy Now!

Danger Ahead: The Risks You Really Face on Life's Highway. New York: John Wiley, 1994.

Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1981.

Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Buy Now!

Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Buy Now!

The Book of Risks: Fascinating Facts About the Chances We Take Everyday. New York: John Wiley, 1994.

Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1996.

Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Buy Now!


Larry Laudan was born on 16 October 1941 in Austin, Texas. He received his BA magna cum laude in physics from the University of Kansas in 1962. He then studied philosophy, earning an MA in 1964 and a PhD in 1965 from Princeton University. His dissertation was titled "The Idea of a Physical Theory from Galileo to Newton: Studies in Seventeenth-Century Methodology," and he studied with Thomas Kuhn. Laudan was a lecturer in philosophy of physics at University College, London from 1965 to 1969. In 1969 he became associate professor of philosophy and history of science at the University of Pittsburgh, and was promoted to full professor in 1972. He served as chair of the history and philosophy of science department during 1972-74 and 1976-77. From 1981 to 1983, Laudan was a visiting research professor at the Center for Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and then stayed as professor of philosophy of science and science studies from 1983 to 1987. From 1987 until his retirement in 1997, Laudan was professor of philosophy at the University of Hawaii. Since 2000 Laudan has been a senior investigator at the Instituto de las Investigaciones Filosoficas of National Autonomous University of Mexico.

Laudan's philosophy of science argues that scientific progress proceeds by problem-solving, of either the empirical or conceptual sort. Since science aims at increasing the number of solved empirical problems (which often requires resolving conceptual problems), then theories are rationally judged by their success in this practical aim. Unlike epistemologists who compare actual scientific methodology with abstract logical criteria having an extra-scientific origin, Laudan's pragmatist theory attempts to show how scientific knowledge has grown. Kuhn and Stephen Toulmin have also made this attempt, and similarly emphasized the role of conceptual problems in theory change, although Laudan finds that even the core tenets of a scientific theory drifts over time. Unlike the positivist and formalist approaches of Karl Popper or Carl Hempel, Laudan does not require that theories be compared according to their derivable sets of observations. The impossibility of such a comparison, apparent by the 1970s, has encouraged scientific relativism, but Laudan is instead interested in the practical rationality of preferring more successful theories.

In Progress and Its Problems (1977), Laudan rejects several time-honored assumptions of previous philosophy of science, including the notions that scientific progress requires (1) a fixed methodology; (2) the cumulative retention of the successes of earlier theories; and (3) a convergence on "the truth." Laudan argues that since we have no way of determining to what extent our scientific theories about unobservable entities are correct, it is irrational to believe that any of our theories are even partially true. Laudan, unlike Paul Feyerabend, does not abandon scientific realism for relativism after denying that we can justifiably make any claims about theoretical truth. To be a scientific realist, for Laudan, only requires recognizing the admitted practical benefits of using theoretical terms in a realist manner and thus requires accepting semantic realism, but scientific realism does not require believing that any of those terms actually corresponds to some reality. Nor does scientific realism receive support from the abductive argument, popularized by Hilary Putnam in the 1970s, that only a scientific theory's approximate truth could explain its practical success. As Laudan points out in "A Confutation of Convergent Realism" (1981) and Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology (1981), most past scientific theories enjoyed much empirical success without being true at all; and many scientific theories might, for all we know, actually be close to the truth without enjoying much practical success. Scientific realism cannot be defended by the principle that "if a scientific theory is true, then it will be successful," any more than a simplistic pragmatism could be defended by the principle "if a scientific theory is successful, then it is true."

Laudan's sophisticated pragmatism instead leaves behind the old epistemological search for a priori methodological rules. Laudan argues that methodological rules in science are best understood as hypothetical imperatives of the form, "to realize cognitive aim A, follow method B." Methodological rules therefore evolve along with science itself, and cannot be legislated outside of actual scientific progress. This normative naturalism, presented at length in Science and Values (1984) and Beyond Positivism and Relativism (1996), requires that epistemological rules of inference have a fallible status like every other scientific claim. The philosophical study of scientific methodology is naturalized, not by W. V. Quine's reduction of epistemology to descriptive psychology, but by evaluating methodologies within the overall progress of actual scientific problem-solving.

---- by John R. Shook, article in Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers (2005)




B.A. (magna cum laude), University of Kansas (Physics), 1962
M.A., Princeton (Philosophy), 1964
Junior Research Fellow, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, 1964-65
Ph.D., Princeton (Philosophy), 1965


Tutor, Churchill College, Cambridge University, 1964-65
Lecturer in Philosophy of Physics, University College, University of London, 1965-69
Co-director, Telluride Institute, Cornell, 1968
Associate Professor of Philosophy and History, University of Pittsburgh, 1969-72
Professor, Departments of Philosophy, History, and History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1972-83 
(Founding) Chair, History and Philosophy of Science, Pitt, 1972-74;1976-77
Academic Visitor, London School of Economics, 1974
Visiting Professor, Philosophy, University of Illinois-Chicago Circle, Spring 1978
Director, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1978-81
Visiting Research Professor, Center for Science & Technology Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, 1981-83
Professor of Philosophy of Science and Science Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, 1983-87
Visiting Professor, History and Philosophy of Science, University of Melbourne, 1984
Visiting Philosopher-in-Residence, University of Rochester, Winter 1985
Visiting Professor, Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, Spring 1986
Professor, Philosophy, University of Hawaii, 1987-97
Chair, Philosophy, University of Hawaii, 1987-92
Director, Program in Applied Philosophy, University of Hawaii, 1990-95
Member, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1992-93
Visiting Researcher, Instituto de las Investigaciones Filosoficas, UNAM, 1996-97
Visiting Fellow, Dibner Institute, M.I.T., 1997
Senior Investigator, Instituto de las Investigaciones Filosoficas, National Autonomous University of Mexico, 2000-


General Editor, Cass Library of Science Classics, 1965-70
General Council, British Society for the History of Science, 1967-69
Executive Committee, British Society for Philosophy of Science, 1968-69
Founder and Editor, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 1969-74
Consultant, Centro Superiore de Logica e Scienze Comparate (Bologna), 1972-present
U.S. delegate from National Research Council to IUHPS (Bucharest), 1975
Organizing Committee, Hunt Workshops in the History of Science, 1972-74 (Chairman, 1974)
Editorial Boards of 18th-Century Life, 1974-80; Philosophy of Science, 1976-91, 1994-present; Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 1969-74, 1977-present; American Philosophical Quarterly, 1977-82; Cadernos, 1977-present; Knowledge, 1982-87; History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1985-88; Knowledge in Society, 1987-present; Theoria, 1995-present
Editor for philosophy and history of science, Encyclopedia Americana, 1967-present
General Editor, Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science (published by University of California Press), 1977-84
Program Committee, Philosophy of Science Association, 1980, 1988
Program Committee, American Philosophical Association, 1987-90
President & Vice-President, American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division), 1993-95


Danforth, Woodrow Wilson, NSF Fellowships, 1962-65
Fulbright Scholar (Cambridge University), 1964-65
Royal Society of London Grant-in-Aid, 1966-67
ACLS Faculty Research Grants, 1967-68; 1972
NSF Faculty Research Grants, 1972-74; 1976-78; 1986-88
Center for International Studies Grant, 1976
Fulbright Senior Research Fellow (Munich, Konstanz), 1976
Fulbright Scholar (Melbourne), 1984
NSF/NEH Sustained Development Scholar, Virginia Tech, 1981-85
Director, NEH Summer Seminar for College Teachers, 1985 [Topic: "Agreement & Disagreement in Science"]
Director, NEH Summer Seminar for College Teachers, 1989 [Topic: "Naturalistic Epistemology"]
NEH and A.W. Mellon Fellow, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1992-93
NEH Faculty Research Grant, 1993-95
Director, NEH Summer Seminar for College Teachers, 1994 [Topic: "Concepts of Evidence"]
Fellow, Burndy Institute, 1997

(Also recipient of grants from the Hunt Foundation, the Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation, the R. K. Mellon Foundation and the Buhl Foundation.)


University of Missouri (Benjamin Lectures)
University of Cincinnati (Taft Lectures);
Brown (Whalen Collegium Lectures)
National Autonomous University of Mexico (Gaos Lectures). 





by Larry Laudan

"Grünbaum on 'the Duhemian Argument'," Philosophy of Science, 32: 296-300. 

a) "The Clock Metaphor and Probablism: The Impact of Descartes on British Methodological Thought, 1650-65," Annals of Science, 22: 73-104. (SH)
b) "Method and the Mechanical Philosophy," History of Science, 5: 117-24.

"The Nature and Sources of Locke's Views on Hypotheses," Journal of the History of Ideas, 23: 211-23. (SH)

a) "Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach," History of Science, 7: 1-63. 

b) "Introduction" to Colin Maclaurin's Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries (Cass, London), ix-xxv.

c) "A Postmortem on the Vis Viva Controversy," Isis, 59: 130-43.

d) "Introduction" to The Collected Works of William Whewell, 5 vols., Cass, London, 1968-77.

"Introduction" to Samuel Clark's translation of Jacques Rohault's System of Natural Philosophy, (Johnson, New York), vol. 1, ix-xxiv.

a) "Commentary," in R. Stuewer, Ed., Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis), 127-32; 230-38.

b) "Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought," in Butts and Davis, Eds., The Methodological Heritage of Newton (University of Toronto Press, Toronto), 103-31. (SH)

a) "William Whewell and the Consilience of Inductions," The Monist, Spring, 368-91. (SH)

b) "Reply to Mary Hesse," The Monist, Spring, 525.

c) "Towards a Re-assessment of Comte's `Méthode Positive'," Philosophy of Science, 38: 35-53. (SH)

d) Reprint of 1966b in Bobbs-Merrill Series in History of Science.

"Charles Sanders Peirce and the Trivialization of the Self-Correction Thesis," in R. Giere and R. Westfall, Foundations of Scientific Method in the 19th Century (Indiana University Press, Bloomington), 375-306. (SH)

a) "Induction and Probability in the 19th Century," Proceedings: IV International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (North Holland, Amsterdam). (SH)

b) "G. L. LeSage: A Case Study in the Interaction of Physics and Philosophy," in Akten des II. Leibniz?Kongresses (Weisbaden), 241-52. (SH)

c) Reprint of 1965 in S. Harding, ed., Can Theories Be Refuted? Dordrecht: Reidel.

a) "The Methodological Foundations of Mach's Opposition to Atomism," in R. Turnbull and P. Machamer, Eds., Motion and Time: Space and Matter (Ohio State University Press, Columbus), 390-417. (SH)

b) "I Modelli Nella Storia della Scienza," in Enciclopedia della Scienza e della Technica (Mondadori, Milan), 467-72.

c) "Two Dogmas of Methodology," Philosophy of Science, 43: 467-72.

a) "The Sources of Modern Methodology," in J. Hintikka and R. Butts, Eds., Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Reidel, Dordrecht), 3-20. (SH)

b) Progress and Its Problems, University of California Press, Berkeley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London; 280 pp. (Paperback issued, Berkeley.)

c) Reprint with new appendix of 1967 in I. Tipton, Locke on Human Understanding (Oxford U. Press: Oxford), 149-62.

"Ex-Huming Hacking," Erkenntnis, 13: 417-35. (SH)

a) Italian translation of Progress and Its Problems, with new introduction. Armando, Rome.

b) "Historical Methodologies," in H. Kyburg & P. Asquith, Eds., Current Research in Philosophy of Science (Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing), 40-54.

a) "Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?," in T. Nickles, Ed., Scientific Discovery, Logic and Rationality (Reidel, Dordrecht), 173-83. (SH)

b) "Views of Progress: Separating the Pilgrims from the Rakes," Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 10: 273-86. 

c) Teorias da Ciencia de Platao e Mach, Beiheft No. 1, Cadernos Series, 89 pp.

a) "The Medium and Its Message: A Study of Some Philosophical Controversies about Ether," in G. Cantor and M. Hodge, Eds., Conceptions of Ether (C.U.P., Cambridge), 157-86. (SH)

b) "A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific Progress," in I. Hacking, Ed., Scientific Revolutions, (Oxford Readings in Philosophy Series, O.U.P., Oxford), 144-55. 

c) "A Confutation of Convergent Realism," Philosophy of Science, 48: 19-49. (SV)

d) "The Pseudo-Science of Science?," Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 11: 173-98. 

e) "The Unfinished Einsteinean Revolution in Philosophy," in P. Barker and C. Shugart, Eds., After Einstein (Memphis State University Press, Memphis), 133-46.

f) "Epilog," in Ibid., 237-40.

g) "Anomalous Anomalies," Philosophy of Science, 48: 618-619.

h) Science and Hypothesis, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 258 pp., (Issued in hardcover and paperback.)

a) "A Reply to My Critics," in I. Hacking and P. Asquith, Eds., PSA-78. Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing. pp.530-50.

b) "More on Bloor," Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 12: 71-74.
c) Italian translation of Science and Hypothesis. Armando, Rome.

d) "Collins' Blend of Relativism and Empiricism," Social Studies of Science, 12: 131-33.

e) "Separating Sheep and Goats," Science, Technology and Human Values, Winter, pp. 000-000.

f) "Two Puzzles about Science," Minerva, 20: 253-268. (SV)

g) "Science at the Bar: Causes for Concern," Science, Technology and Human Values, 7: 16-19. 

h) "Problems, Truth and Consistency," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 13: 73-80.

a) "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem," in R. Cohen and L. Laudan, Eds., Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 111-128. (Reprinted in R. Laudan, ed., Virginia Tech Working Papers in STS (Blacksburg).)

b) "Invention and Justification," Philosophy of Science, 50: 320-22.

c) "Confusions about Discovery," in PSA-82 (Philosophy of Science Association, forthcoming), c.27 pp.

d) Italian translation of 1980b, Armando, Rome.

e) Italian translation of 1981b in a volume published by Guis. Laterza & Figli, Rome.

f) Reprint of 1982g in J. Murphy, Ed., Evolution, Morality, and the Meaning of Life. Rowman & Littlefield, Tatawa, N.J. pp. 149-154, 

g) Reprint of 1982g in M. La Follette, ed. Creationism, Science, and the Law. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. pp. 161-166.

h) Editor, Mind and Medicine: Problems of Explanation and Evaluation in Psychiatry and the Biomedical Sciences. Berkeley: University of California Press, 365 pp.

i) Editor (with R. S. Cohen), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Reidel, Dordrecht, 338 pp.

j) "More on Creationism," in Science, Technology and Human Values, 8: 36-38.

a) "Realism without the Real," Philosophy of Science, 51:156-62.

b) Science and Values. Berkeley: University of California Press: 149 pp. (Issued in hardcover and paperback.)

c) "Explaining the Success of Science: Beyond Epistemic Realism and Relativism," G. Gutting et al., eds., Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science. Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. 83-105.

d) Reprint of 1981c in J. Leplin, Ed., Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 

e) "Reconstructing Methodology," in P. Anderson & M. Ryan, eds., Scientific Method in Marketing: Philosophy, Sociology and History of Science Perspectives. Chicago: American Marketing Association.

f) Spanish translation of 1981b in a volume published by Cuerva, Madrid.

g) Reprint of 1981d in J. Brown, Ed., Scientific Rationality: the Sociological Turn. University of Toronto Press.

h) Chinese translation of 1981b in Journal for the Philosophical Problems of Natural Sciences, No. 1, pp. 74-80.

i) Chinese translation of 1980a in Journal for the Philosophical Problems of Natural Science, No. 3, pp. 58-62.

j) Chinese (abridged) translation of chapter two of 1982c in Journal for the Philosophical Problems of Natural Sciences, no. 2, pp. 62-69. 

a) "Kuhn's Critique of Methodology," in J. Pitt, ed., Change and Progress in Modern Science. Reidel, Dordrecht. 283-300. (SV)

b) Japanese translation of Progress and Its Problems, with new postscript. Schisuza, Tokyo.

a) "Some Problems facing Intuitionistic Meta-Methodologies," Synthese, 67: 115-129.

b) (and others). "Testing Theories of Scientific Change," Synthese, 69: 141-223.

c) "Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change," in J. Kourany, Scientific Knowledge. Wadsworth, Belmont, Ca. pp. 276-95.

d) Spanish translation of Progress and Its Problems, with new postscript. Ediciones Encuentro, Madrid.

e) "Perché regna l'accordo nelle scienze (naturali)?" Nuova Civilta delle Macchine, 4: 58-64.

a) "Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism," American Philosophical Quarterly, 24: 19-33.

b) "Relativism, Naturalism and Reticulation," Synthese, 71: 25pp.

c) Italian translation of Science and Values. Laterza, Rome.

d) Dynamique de la Science (Pierre Mardaga: Liège) 264pp. (A translation, with a new foreword of Progress and Its Problems.)

e) "Methodology: Its Prospects," PSA-86, vol. 2 (P. Machamer, ed., East Lansing, Mich.). 25pp. 

a) (with R. Laudan & A. Donovan), eds., Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change. Reidel: Dordrecht. 379pp.

b) "Introduction" to 1988a, pp. 3-44.

c) Reprint of 1982g in J. Feinberg, T. Beauchamp, eds., Philosophy and the Human Condition. 2nd ed.

d) German translation of 1980a in L. Schafer, Die Wiederentdeckung des Entdeckens. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M.

e) "Are All Theories Equally Good? A Dialogue," in R. Nola, ed., Relativism and Realism in Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp. 117-39.

f) Reprint of 1982g in M. Ruse, ed., But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. pp.351-56.

g) "Cognitive Relativism," in R. Egidi, ed., La Svolta Relativistica nell'Epistemologia Contemporanea. (Rome: Franco Angeli), 203-224.

h) "Conceptual Problems Re-Visited," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 19: 531-34. forthcoming. 8pp.

i) Reprint of 1983a in M. Ruse, ed., But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in he Creation/Evolution Controversy. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. pp.337-350.

j) Reprint of 1983j in M. Ruse, ed., But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. pp. 363-66.

k) "If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40: 369-75.

l) "Perspectiva critica asupra axiologiei si metodologiei realiste," in A. Botez, ed., Metamorfoze actuale in Filosofia Stiintei (Bucharest), 89-115. [Translation of a section from 1984b.]

a) "Thoughts on HPS: 20 Years Later," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, pp. 9-13. 

b) (with Rachel Laudan). "Dominance and the Disunity-of-Method: Solving the Problems of Innovation and Consensus," Philosophy of Science, 56: 221-37.

c) "The Rational Weight of the Scientific Past: Forging Fundamental Change in a Conservative Discipline," in Michael Ruse, ed., What the Philosophy of Biology Is: Essays dedicated to David Hull (Dordrecht: Kluwer). 209-20.

d) "For Method; Or, Against Feyerabend," in J. Brown et al., eds., An Intimate Relation: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 299-318.

a) "History of Science and the Philosophy of Science," in M. Hodge et al., eds., Companion to the History of Science (London: Routledge) 47-59.

b) "Normative Naturalism," Philosophy of Science, 57:44-59. [A response to a symposium issue of this journal containing 3 papers discussing my work.]

c) Science and Relativism: Dialogues on the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 173pp.

d) "Aim-Less Epistemology?" British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming. 13pp.

e) "De-Mystifying Underdetermination," in W. Savage, ed., Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 267-97. 

a) (with J. Leplin). "Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination," Journal of Philosophy, September, 1-23. [Voted by The Philosopher's Annual as "among the ten best philosophy papers in 1991."]

b) Reprint of 1981c in R. Boyd et al., ed., Philosophy of Science (MIT Press). 1991

c) Chinese translation of Progress and Its Problems. transl.: Fang. Shanghai Publishing Company: Shanghai.

d) "Scientific Progress and Content Loss," in E. Deutsch, ed., Proc. of VI East/West Philosophers' Congress. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu.

e) Reprint of 1976c in B. Brody and R. Grandy, eds., Philosophy of Science (Prentice Hall: Princeton ).

a) "Why Do Scientists Agree?" in W. Shea & A. Spadafora, eds., Interpreting the World: Science and Society. Science History Publications: Canton, MA., pp. 89-102.

b) (with J. Leplin). "Determination Underdeterred," Analysis . 11 pp.

c) 2nd edition of 1988a, with a new introduction. Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore.

d) Spanish translation of 1981c in Olivé & Perez, eds., Realismo (Coyoaçan, Mexico).

e) Reprint of 1991a in The Philosopher's Annual, vol. xiv.

a) Spanish translation of Science and Values, Ediciones Encuentro, Madrid.

b) "Waves, Particles, Independent Tests and the Limits of Inductivism," in K. Okruhlick & D. Hull, eds., PSA 1992, vol. 2, 28pp.

a) The Book of Risks. John Wiley: New York. 250 pp.

b) "APA Presidential Address," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.

c) Reprint of 1984c in A. Tauber, ed., Science: The Quest for Reality (London: Macmillan)

d) "Il ruolo della tradizione nella razionalità scientifica," in A. Vergati and A. Pagnini, Storia della Filosofia: Saggi in Onore de Paolo Rossi (Firenze: Nuova Italia Editrice), 111-28.

a) Beyond Positivism and Relativism (Boulder: Westview Press). 375 pp.

a) "Una Teoría de la Evaluación Comparativa de Teorías Científicas," in W. Gonzalez, ed., Jornadas en Torno al Pensamiento de L. Laudan (Universidad de la Coruna: Ferrol, Spain).

b) Danger Ahead. John Wiley. 227 pp.

c) "How About Bust?" Philosophy of Science 64, 306-316.

d) "La Teoría de la Investigación Tomada en Serio," in A. Velasco, ed., Racionalidad y Cambio Científico (Mexico City: UNAM), 25-42.

a) "Naturalismo Normativo y El Progreso de la Filosofía," in W. Gonzalez, ed., El Pensamiento de L. Laudan (Coruña, Spain: University Press of Coruña), 105-116.

b) "Epistemología, Realismo y Evaluación Racional de Teorías," in A. Velasco, Progreso, Pluralismo y Racionalidad en la Ciencia: Homenaje a Larry Laudan (Mexico City: UNAM), 27-42.

c) "Respuestas a los Críticos," in A. Velasco, Progreso, Pluralismo y Racionalidad en la Ciencia: Homenaje a Larry Laudan (Mexico City: UNAM), 291-318.

d) "Una Teoría de la Evaluación Comparativa de Teorías Científicas," in W. Gonzalez, ed., El Pensamiento de L. Laudan (Coruña, Spain: University Press of Coruña), 155-170.

a) "Is Epistemology Adequate to the Task of Rational Theory Evaluation?" in R. Nola & H. Sankey, eds., After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Issues in Theories of Scientific Method (Dordrecht: Kluwer). 165-76.