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JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER AND WILLIAM JAMES: ASPECTS OF ANTICIPATORY THINKING

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ABSTRACT

The revival in Germany of Herder's legacy over the past three decades has been energized by an expansion and intensification of his reception in North America. Born a century apart and spending their lives in very different worlds, Herder and William James are unlikely candidates to support a thesis of direct influence. Nevertheless, there are intriguing correspondences pertaining to cognition, truth, the relation of thought and feeling, the body/mind dichotomy, and other issues that invite scrutiny. There are also some biographical indicators that suggest a measure of familiarity with Herder's life and works on the part of James. A close reading of some of their writings on religion conveys striking affinities.

This paper reflects an initial effort by someone long involved with Herder to become acquainted with James. Originally addressing an audience of Herder scholars, the paper was revised and expanded to utilize aspects of recent James studies. Though the case for direct influence could not be made, there are Jamesian formulations that echo Herderian views. Looked at in tandem, Herder and James reinforce current efforts by researchers to clarify the interaction of thought and feeling in the quest for truth. What are redundancies to specialists on one side may facilitate discoveries on the other.

Writing in 1830, John James Tayler (1797-1869), one of the earliest and most perceptive advocates of Herder's thought in the English-speaking world, addressed the issue of originality and influence:

Where there is a free interchange of ideas amongst men, a floating atmosphere of thought is set in action, the result of a thousand casual and mingling contributions, which exerts such an effect on every individual mind subjected to its influence, as

renders it extremely difficult to decide, in regard to many of our most important views and opinions, what is original and what is borrowed. Truth, however, is every man's property; and whatever an individual deeply feels and sincerely believes, is his own, wherever it may have originated.¹

Taylor's "advertisement" is pertinent to this essay on Herder as a forerunner of William James not only because it raises the perennial issue of originality in reception history, but because it takes a position on truth that mattered greatly to both Herder and James. After an introduction to some general characteristics and major themes that invite the suggestion of kinship between Herder and James, a brief exploration of James's familiarity with German thought and letters will lead to the topic of religion that governs this conference and to some concluding reflections.

A century and worlds apart in many ways, Herder and James nevertheless shared some striking characteristics: Both were at odds with some of the major intellectual trends of their day pertaining especially to the limits and ends of human cognition in the quest for truth. Both struggled with and stressed the close relation of thought and feeling. Both opposed dualistic thinking—the body/mind dichotomy— and, on the other hand, monistic absolutism. Both were scrupulous adherents of the scientific method who nevertheless had no scruples to affirm the existence of the intangibles. Both embraced the need for popular phrasings in the face of academic obscurities. Both wrestled with the meaning of the self and self-formation. Both had a powerful and lasting, to this day not fully acknowledged, impact on their respective posterities.

Herder's concept of truth was discussed at this meeting by Rainer Godel. Godel's careful analysis of the elements underlying Herder's conception of truth, rendering it as a process rather than of logical permanence, struck this listener immediately upon hearing it at the conference as a "reverse echo" of what James has to say on the subject in his *Pragmatism* and in *The Meaning of Truth*.² Godel finds "Herder's use of the term 'truth,' [...] strongly related with the anthropological conditions human beings underlie even when attempting to find the truth." Godel's discussion of these conditions confirms to the reader of James's works the initial impression of an enduring kinship between the two men (Godel 2011, 4). This kinship becomes apparent especially in Chapter III of *The Meaning of Truth*, "Humanism and Truth" (James 1987,

857-880). When James here says that “[...] in our ordinary life the mental terms are images and the real ones are sensations [...] (871), he touches on Godel’s discussion of “imagined/poetic truth,” with its reference to Herder’s discussion of the truth and vivacity of images as they convey their pregnancy and clarity (Godel 2011, 8-9). When James concluded that “Truth here is a relation, not of our ideas to non-human relations, but of conceptual parts of our experience to sensational parts” (871), he anticipated a subject of discussion much present in contemporary Herder scholarship. Of particular interest here is the recent Gaier/Simon volume entitled *Between Image and Concept: Kant and Herder on the Schema*.³ The fundamental formulation of the questions posed by the editors, when reduced to catchwords, presents Kant as asking “how does one render categories perceptual?”, while Herder would ask “how does one conceptualize images?” (Gaier/Simon 2010, 9). Although the editors proclaim the perennial conflict between Kant and Herder unsolvable (11), their focus on the schema and the recruitment of contributors with quite divergent views results in an impressive advancement of a heretofore stifled discourse and a notable refinement of highly relevant issues. The fact that, to some contributors, Kant and Herder were closer to one another than indicated by the polemical tone of their discourse, will set new directions for commentators. With respect to this essay the contribution of Hans Adler is of particular relevance. Entitled “Metaschema und Aisthesis. Herders Gegenentwurf zu Kant” (Gaier/Simon 2010, 119-154), Adler’s thoughtful “counterdesign” to Kant’s unyielding dominance carefully reviews the initial commonalities between the two men as well as the major contentious issues that marked the prolonged controversy. For the purpose of substantiating my thesis of a kinship between Herder and William James, Adler’s section entitled “Metaphor Research and ‘Embodied Truth’” [“Metaphernforschung und ‘leibhafte Wahrheit’”] (152-154, 152) is especially helpful. Citing the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson on “[...] the embodied origins of human meaning and thought,” Adler provided me with a reference to the William James whom I introduced earlier as characterized by his opposition to the body/mind dichotomy (Adler 2010, 152). Adler’s compact summary and meticulous documentation of Johnson’s proposed “‘general theory of embodied cognition’” undeviatingly culminates in a quite justified complaint about the complete neglect in this “indeed productive research” of Herder as a “compatible forerunner” (153).⁴ In the 2005 essay, Johnson presents Kant’s effort to use the “schema” as “[...] a connecting link, a ‘third thing,’ that would bind the concept, which he

thought of as *formal* to the *matter* of sensation” (Johnson 2005, 2). Johnson concludes that “The chief problem with Kant’s account is that it is based on an absolute dichotomy between form and matter” (3). Johnson reminds us that “James even went so far as to claim that we ‘feel’ logical relations, such as those indicated by *if... then*, *and*, and *but*. The “but” was to appear again in the title of the James chapter of Johnson’s 2007 volume. Concluding the earlier article, Johnson observed that “[...] James never succeeded in convincing people to take seriously the role of feeling in thought,” and that “Only now, a century or more later, are cognitive neuro-scientists returning to some of James’s insights about the quality of thought and the role of emotion in reasoning” (Johnson 2005, 18-20, 19). Johnson was surprised when he was informed by this writer that –yet more than one century earlier– Herder had brought upon himself the undying wrath of Kant for stating views on thought and feeling, and on the mind/body dichotomy, remarkably anticipatory of James. In the chapter “Feeling William James’s ‘But’. The Aesthetics of Reasoning and Logic,” Mark Johnson forcefully reiterates the points made regarding the role of feeling in the process of thinking made in the 2005 essay. He then traces the significance of words such as “but” in human speech back to James’s *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), where James initially had made the case for the part of feelings in logical thought (Johnson 2007, 94-98).⁵ Most notably Johnson then relates these passages to James’s late essays on “Percept and Concept,” posthumously published in *Some Problems of Philosophy* (James II, 997-1106, 1002-1039). He aptly sums up his reasons for including a chapter on James in his challenging volume:

In his amazing two-volume work *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) and in his later essay “Percept and Concept” (1911), William James explored a way to conceive of concepts without succumbing to the dualistic ways of thinking that underlie the objectivist way of cognition. The key, he realized, was not to fall into the dualistic trap of thinking of percepts and concepts as different in kind and to see them, rather as two aspects of a continuous flow of feeling-thinking” (Johnson 2007, 87).

For the reader familiar with Herder’s views on these issues, confirmed by recent scholarship, the similarities are indeed striking.

For a neophyte in the world of William James whose entry was eased by the standard works of Perry, Myers, Richardson, et al., especially the splendid *Cambridge Companion*, the discovery of Francesca Bordogna's important addition to the literature has been a major find.⁶ Considered by Eugene Taylor "[...] the single most important contribution to James scholarship since John McDermott and Charlene Haddock Seigfried identified radical empiricism as the core of James's metaphysics," Bordogna inadvertently provides significant support for the suggestion that the themes sketched above indicate a Herder/James kinship.⁷

By placing her discussion of James's account of truth into the context of human feelings, cognition, and volition, and by suggesting "[...] that he offered not only a psychology of truth [...], but also a physiology of truth," Bordogna's chapter on "Mental Boundaries and Pragmatic Truth" (4, 137-153,) in effect leads to a reconsideration of the Herderian position sketched above. Her review of Hilary Putnam's "four central components in James's account of truth" solidified for this reader that the Jamesian notion of truth as process was also central to Herder's approach (139-141).⁸ But Bordogna goes beyond Putnam by pursuing James's "central [...]" contention that not only interests but also emotions, volitions and purposes could play an important role in the production of truth [...]" (141-144). Bordogna's sub-section entitled "Embodied Truth" addresses the issues raised by Hans Adler in the Gaier/Simon volume and by Mark Johnson in his various writings cited above. By making clear that James's contemporaries found his "blurring" of "[...] the divide that separated the intellect from the body [...] unacceptable" (145), and that critics objected to his "[...] embodying truth in the psychological and physiological workings of the knower" as denigrating the dignity of both the philosopher and the notion of 'truth,'" Bordogna evokes echoes of the unending Herder/Kant dispute. Quite intriguing in this section is Bordogna's claim that "James, however, extended the motor view to all ideas and made it into the cornerstone of his conception of the will (147; James 1992, 386-426, esp. 420-426). In his pioneering essay on "Luther in Herder's Labors," Günter Arnold has demonstrated the ambiguous evolution of the Lutheran preacher beholden to the "bonded will" into an advocate of its freedom. Arnold's profound early essay and Martin Keßler's unprecedented, elaborate and thorough examination of Herder's professional life will be major sources for a much needed study of Herder's views on the subject.⁹ Arnold's observation of Herder's endeavor to grasp "the totality of the human being as the unity of all his inherent powers and contradictions" ["Die

Totalität des Menschen als Einheit seiner Wesenskraefte und Widersprüche [...]”] gives food for thought on a subject that here cannot be explored further (Arnold 1986, 251). Nevertheless, Bordogna’s probing discussion, in the section “The Psychology of Truth: Feeling, Cognition, and Volition,” of the interplay of these three faculties with reason in the quest for truth (148-153) merits also to be read in the context of Herder’s *Ideen*.¹⁰

For this writer, the most meaningful chapter of Bordogna’s book is the one dealing with the dimensions of the Self: “Ecstasy and Community. James and the Politics of the Self” (6, 189-217). Going far beyond the “Politics of the Self,” and stressing its divisions, possible unification, and ultimate meaning, Bordogna’s rich account touches in multiple ways on Herder’s abiding concern with the subject, including significant reference to Gustav Theodor Fechner, who will be discussed later (207-208). Herder’s most pertinent prose discussion of the subject, the 1781 essay “Liebe und Selbstheit” [“Love and Selfhood”], was available in the English translation of Frederic Henry Hedge since 1847.¹¹ Underlying much of Herder’s thought during his prime as well as in his later years, the subject of the Self was profoundly explored by him in two long didactic poems that became part of his *Scattered Leaves* in 1797.¹² Considered by many Herder scholars as reflecting some of his deepest aspirations and concerns, these poems together with the prose essays that surround them in the 6th edition of the *Scattered Leaves* complement what James had to say on the subject in Bordogna’s reading.

My initial proposition that James and Herder shared some characteristics and my discussion of significant themes inviting comparison raise the question whether James was in any way directly acquainted with Herder’s thought and works.

In the course of his multiple journeys to Europe over a lifetime William James visited Germany quite frequently and, as a young man, he had several extended stays there for study as well as to seek cures for his various ailments. His command of the language appears to have been proficient and his familiarity with German thought and letters was quite outstanding. Writing from Dresden to Arthur George Sedgwick on March 23, 1868, the then twenty-six year old convalescent presented an interesting early appraisal of Germany and its inhabitants, culminating in this observation: “[...]I know of no people to whose sense I would rather abandon a project or idea that lay near my heart [...]”¹³

In a letter of June 1, 1869 to his brother Henry, William listed a string of German writers, among them Herder, whose works he had read and he strongly encouraged Henry to learn the language, concluding that a stay there would bring significant rewards.¹⁴ Of particular interest here is young William James's astounding familiarity with Goethe's life and a wide range of his works, as his recent and most knowledgeable biographer observed (Richardson 2006, 91-92). Citing James's letter to Tom Ward, Richardson gives his readers an early Jamesian take on Goethe that might as well have served as a reflection on Herder: "He thought Goethe 'had a deep belief in the reality of Nature as she lies developed and a contempt for bodiless formulas. Through every individual fact he came in contact with the world, and he strove and fought without ceasing ever to lay his mind more and more wide open to Nature's teaching'" (Richardson 2006, 91-92; James 1992-2004, 1995, 306-307).

For a historian seeking to establish the direct proximity of James to sources supporting the revival of Herder's reputation in America during the 1870s, the work of Karl Hillebrand must once more be alluded to. Hillebrand's three extensive articles on Herder in the *North American Review* of 1872/73 came to my attention during my work on the American Transcendentalists (Hillebrand 1872-1873). Looking at James's correspondence I was much surprised to learn not only that both William and Henry James knew Hillebrand well over a long stretch of time and visited him in Florence at several occasions, but also that a review of Theophile Gautier by Henry James appeared alongside the third of Hillebrand's Herder articles in the *North American Review*. The entire issue of the *NAR* in turn was then reviewed in *The Nation*, with elaborate references to the contributions by Henry James on Gautier and Karl Hillebrand on Herder.¹⁵ Substantial portions of Hillebrand's Herder articles were incorporated in the six lectures on German thought given by Hillebrand in London in May and June of 1879 that were published in several editions in New York. Under the chapter heading "The Age of Herder (1770-1786)," Chapter III established the critical role Herder played in the shaping of German thought not only during these years, but also during the Classical and Romantic periods extending deep into the nineteenth century (Hillebrand 1880, 117-172). The contacts with Hillebrand reflected in the correspondence of the James brothers during the 1870s right up to his death in 1884 render it likely that they were aware of Hillebrand's view of Herder. Alas, more may not be said at this

point about any direct influence of Herder's "anticipatory thinking with any degree of certainty (James 1992-2004, 1992, 194-195, 232, 237, 206, 211, 228, 324, 330).

Nevertheless, based on an awareness of William James's exposure to German thought and letters discussed in the foregoing, a further focused reading of some of his writings, searching for direct or indirect influences, seemed to be called for. Read in the context of the currents of thought generated by his father and his Transcendentalist friends, such a reading reveals some of the sources that enabled James to face down the positivist challenges of the later nineteenth century. Ralph Barton Perry long ago has aptly sketched the outline:

James began his philosophical thinking about 1860, at a time when the enemies of science and religion were being mobilized for the war which lasted out the century, and in which James sought to be a mediator. How he adhered to the British empirical tradition, how he sought to liberalize this tradition and reconcile it with religion, and how he fought against its great adversary, Hegelianism, make up the theme of James's early philosophical orientation.¹⁶

What in Perry's 1936 account is described as "the theme of James's *early* philosophical orientation" appears to some current observers as extending through his entire life. Examining James's *The Will to Believe*, Richardson concluded that "[...], this volume is our best warrant for saying that James was always interested in psychology, religion, and philosophy, and that what we are sometimes tempted to regard as progression is simply the continual turning this way and that of a grand central concern that had all three facets for James (Richardson 2006, 361-365, 364). The theme of continuity from the generation of Henry James senior's friends to the end of William James's life is also confirmed by the conclusion of Philip Gura's splendid new history of American Transcendentalism.¹⁷

If psychology, religion, and philosophy then were the "three facets" of James's "[...] grand central concern," as he endeavored to be a mediator between "[...]scientific agnosticism and the religious view of the world [...]," he derived much sustenance in his struggle from German sources.¹⁸ For the purposes of this conference, on "Herder and Religion," James's *The Will to Believe* may be the most suitable of his works to conclude an examination with respect to

Herder as *Vordenker*.¹⁹ Based on talks to various student organizations, the ten essays making up the volume were written during the years from 1879 to 1896, demonstrating William's sustained interest in the grand theme sketched above. In the "Preface" James was specific about his purpose: "The first four essays are," he wrote, "largely concerned with defending the legitimacy of religious faith."²⁰ A reader of these essays who is also familiar with Herder's writings on religion will find that quite a few of James's concerns were anticipated by the German thinker at various points of his life.

Introducing his commentary on the last of Herder's *Christliche Schriften, Von Religion, Lehrmeinungen und Gebräuchen* (1798), Christoph Bultmann has given us an instructive sketch of Herder's lifelong occupation with the "Thema Religion." Listing the writings on religion, beginning with the 1766 excerpts from Hume's *Natural History of Religion* and including the most significant titles from the Bückeburg and Weimar periods, Bultmann demonstrates the continuity of Herder's concern with religion while he was also working on a vast variety of other subjects. Bultmann concludes his introduction with a vital word of advice: "'Es ist für die Herderinterpretation fruchtbar, gerade gattungsmäßig nicht zusammenhängende Werke auf ihre gemeinsamen Intentionen, Sachgegenstände und die Wechselbeziehungen in ihrer Genese zu befragen.'" ["It is fruitful for Herder interpreters to examine especially the generically not connected works with respect to their common intentions, subject matter, and their effects on one another in their genesis"] (FA 9/1, 727-857, 1145-1146). But, again, it is Rudolf Haym who gives us the necessary details from the young Herder's encounter with Hume to the powerful reiteration of his personal creed in the last of his *Christliche Schriften*, approaching the eve of his life.²¹

How does Herder define religion here? Stressing "Naturreligion" [natural religion], "Menschen- und Völkerreligion" [human- and peoples' religion], the "Religion der Erfahrung" [the religion of experience], based on the faith that "ought to be called 'Religion der Menschheit'" [the religion of humanity], Herder defined his creed by proclaiming:

"[...]denn Religion ist, was unser Herz zwingend anspricht, unsrer Triebe sich bemächtigt, Gesinnung erweckt und unser innigstes Bewußtsein bindet [...]. Nicht nach dem Christentum allein; nach des Menschen eigenster Natur ist seine

Religion keine andre als *Menschlichkeit, wirksame Treue und Liebe*. “[...] for religion is what compellingly speaks to our heart, masters our instincts, arouses our sense of duty and binds our innermost consciousness [...]. Not in accord with Christendom alone, but in accord with the human being’s most intimate nature is his religion none other than *humanity, active trust and love*” (FA 9/1, 784, 785, 829).

Defending the legitimacy of religious faith in the first four essays of *The Will to Believe*, William James touches on several critical issues that were stressed by Herder in the last of his *Christliche Schriften*. In “The Sentiment of Rationality,” the earliest of the essays written in 1879-1880, James already presents a definition of religious faith, likening it to courage in practical affairs, reflecting the average man’s “power to trust” as an “essential function.” Very much like Herder he takes issue with scientists who deny the justification and efficacy of faith, concluding that “The only escape from faith is mental nullity [...]. We cannot live or think at all without some degree of hypothesis” (James 1992, 524-527). Fifteen years later, in the lead essay that gave the book its title, and in its sequence, “Is Life Worth Living?,” James has fortified his position. Resentful of a science that, preoccupied with the method of verification, has “[...] ceased to care for truth by itself at all,” he asserts that “[...]science would be far less advanced than she is if the passionate desires of individuals to get their own faiths confirmed had been kept out of the game” (James 1992, 471). But now, turning to the religious hypothesis, affirming “the more eternal things” as “the best things,” he assures his listeners that “the second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true” (James 1992, 474-475). By the time he wrote the last of the ten essays in 1896, “Is Life Worth Living?,” James was ready to proclaim, inveighing powerfully against the darkness of suicidal thoughts, “[...] that we have a right to believe the physical order to be only a partial order; that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem to us better worth living again” (James 1992, 495; Richardson 2006, 354-356). Composing the “Preface” to the volume in December of 1896, James had found in pluralism as “[...] the permanent form of the world” the basis for the “radical empiricism” of his final years that also accommodated his lectures on “the varieties of religious experience.”

A century earlier, also approaching the final years of his life, Herder had emphatically reiterated his conviction that faith was central to his universe. He did so not only in the last of his *Christliche Schriften* but also in the 6th Collection of the *Zerstreute Blätter*.²² Keeping in mind the time of the composition, 1796-1797, Rudolf Haym observed that the 6th Collection of the *Zerstreute Blätter* “[...] was itself a kind of Christliche Schrift (Haym 1885, 578). Aside from the two poems on the “mortal I” and the “immortal Self,” probing, in Haym’s words “[...] the deepest foundations of Herder’s faith and convictions [...] (“[...]steigen in die tiefsten Gründe von Herders Glaubens- und Überzeugungsleben hinab [...]”), the essays “On Knowing and Not-Knowing the Future” and “On Knowing, Divining, Desiring, Hoping and Believing” endorse the thrust of the final *Christliche Schrift* (Haym 1885, 578, 580-585). When Herder concluded Section V of *Von Religion*[...] by proclaiming “[...] these veins of Christianity, *Faith, Love, and Hope*, and their root, genuine conscientiousness, as the only and immanent human religion [...]” and finds, in the next Section dealing with religion and science, that all higher learning “[...] in the end must indeed harken back to religion, that is to an innermost human consciousness [...],” he left a testimony to his own priorities.²³

My own reading of Herder’s *Religionsschrift* and its echoes in the last issue of the *Zerstreute Blätter* as anticipating James’s eloquent defense of religious faith a century later finds support in Matthias Wolfes’s brilliant interpretation of Herder’s “free religiosity” (Wolfes 2005). William James concluded his *Varieties* by proclaiming that “[...] the total expression of human experience, as I view it objectively, invincibly urges me beyond the narrow ‘scientific’ bounds [...]” and by asking “Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks?” (James 1987, 1-477, 463). Building up to this conclusion of his final and autobiographical Gifford Lecture, James moves on to a confession to his readers. He explains why he has “seemed so bent on rehabilitating the element of feeling in religion and subordinating its intellectual part” by concluding that “Individuality is founded in feeling;[...]”, a very Herderian formulation.²⁴ Lack of time allows me only a brief comment on the man who, in my judgment, strongly influenced James’s religious views, Gustav Theodor Fechner.

James’s *A Pluralistic Universe*, the book that grew out of the May 1908 “Hibbert Lectures,” contains as “Lecture 4” an essay entitled “Concerning Fechner.” In the *Hibbert*

Journal the lecture still bears the fascinating title “The doctrine of the Earth-Soul and of Beings Intermediate Between Man and God.”²⁵ The Fechner celebrated in Lecture 4 of James’s *A Pluralistic Universe*, a year before his death, had been for him a source “[...]of long standing interest [...]” In 1836, thirty-five years old, Fechner had published his *Das Büchlein vom Leben nach dem Tode*, a book republished several times, translated into English in 1904 and supplied with a preface by William James, that had earned him much positivist contempt, as well as high praise from scholars such as Wilhelm Wundt.²⁶

In addition to Thomas Borgard’s pathbreaking 1999 dissertation, his essay on Lotze’s Herderrezeption and his paper on Poe, Lotze, and Herder prepared for this conference, substantiate my thesis of Herder’s role as a *Vordenker* of late-nineteenth-century currents of thought.²⁷

My own reading of Fechner’s “metaphysical” writings with respect to their impact on William James leaves me persuaded that the “personal” parts of his *Varieties* were significantly shaped by Fechner’s take on religion. Fechner’s *Glaubenssätze* (“Mandates of Faith”), concluding the *Zend Avesta*, read like a very Christian “Confession of Faith.” Their insistence in “Article 4” that “[...] in God’s Order of the World (*Weltordnung*) nothing unnatural and supernatural takes place” will have given James a boost, as he read the second edition of the book once more in 1905.²⁸ When I see in Fechner’s “Confession of Faith” an anticipation of James’s “*The Will to Believe*,” I am amused to know that, in 1994, even Herder was accused of practicing “the will to believe” when the sincerity of his work was questioned by a contemporary scholar.²⁹

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NOTES

¹Taylor 1830, "Advertisement," iii-iv. I owe this citation to John Vivian, a participant at the 2010 Conference of the International Herder Society, at which this paper was presented. See also Vivian, 2008.

²James 1987, *Pragmatism*, 479-624, 572-590; *The Meaning of Truth*, 821-978, 857-880. Rainer Godel kindly made the draft of his conference paper available to me. I cite from his manuscript.

³Gaier/Simon, 2010. See also Simon, 2010.

⁴See Mark Johnson, “Feeling William James’s ‘But.’ The Aesthetics of Reasoning and Logic” in Johnson 2007, 86-112; and Johnson, “The Philosophical Significance of Image Schemas” in Hampe/Grady 2005. Professor Johnson kindly made his manuscript of the article available to me. I use his pagination.

⁵William James, *The Principles of Psychology*. 2 Vols., New York: Dover 1890, 245-247, 252-253. I use James’s *Psychology. Briefer Course* (1892) in James 1992, 1-443. “The Stream of Consciousness,” 152-173, esp., 161-162.

⁶Bordogna 2008. Professor Bordogna’s thoughtful personal consultation was of inestimable value to my present effort.

⁷Taylor 2009, 138-140, 138. Though one may not agree with Taylor’s view of Transcendentalism as “[...] the first uniquely American philosophy independent of European roots,” his critique of the “narrowing [...] intellectual and spiritual scope of modern American thought” and of Bordogna’s work as effectively counteracting this trend, is well take (140).

⁸Putnam 1997, 166-185. See also Lamberth 2009. Lamberth’s 2008 Presidential Address to the William James Society provided multiple contact points for the issues raised by Putnam and Bordogna. His extensive references to Hermann Lotze inadvertently facilitate my effort to link Herder and James.

⁹Arnold, 1986, 225-274, 249-253. For multiple references to Herder’s concept of freedom, if not “The Freedom of the Will,” see the references provided for me by Martin Keßler from his monumental dissertation. Keßler 2007, 520f, 546-549, 556, 573, 909, 919, 912, 934, 936, 938, 950, 977, 1009f, the appendix A225, and Keßler 2008, 160. Keßler’s extraordinarily thorough documentation of Herder’s nuanced approach throws light on the equally challenging battles of James in a world of scientific determinism.

¹⁰*Johann Gottfried Herder Werke*, 3 Vols. Ed. by Wolfgang Pross. Vol. III/1, Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag 2002. Especially the “Nachwort, 837-1041, 992-1006. For Pross see Zammito et al, 2010, 678-684.

¹¹*FA* 4, 405-424, 1062-1071. Hedge’s translation appeared first in his anthology *The Prose Writers of Germany* (1847, repr. 1848). I use the later edition, Philadelphia: Potter 1870.

¹²“Das Ich” and “Selbst,” in *Zerstreute Blaetter*, 6th Collection, Gotha: Ettinger 1791. *FA* 3, 825-830; 830-834. English tr. Menze 2010, 27-43, “The I,” 35-38; “The Self,” 38-41.

¹³James 1992-2004, 1995, William James to Arthur George Sedgwick. Dresden, March 23, 1868, 269-276, 273-274.

¹⁴James, 1992-2004, 1992. WJ to HJ, Cambridge, June 1, 1869. “[...]To me now the french mind seems strangely monotonous—for form—je ne dis pas! but for ideas I don’t feel as if I should ever find new ones in a french book, not<hing> but a diffuse re-shuffling of the everlasting old stock. In Germany on the contrary there are *for us*, and (I imagine) being produced all the while new *ideas*. Reading of the revival or rather the birth of German literature, Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Schlegels, Tieck, Richter, Herder, Steffens, W. Humboldt, and a number of others, puts one into a real classical period. These men are interesting as *men*, each standing as a type or representative of a certain way of taking life, and beginning at the bottom— taking nothing for granted.” For a German reader of James, the frequent and quite appropriate insertions of German words, phrases and even stanzas of poetry in his texts never cease to amaze.

¹⁵James 1992-2004, 1995), 4, 458-461, to Alice James, Florence, Nov. 23, 1873; 471-473, to Alice James, Rome Dec. 17, 1873; 480-481, 480, to his mother, Florence, Jan. 26, 1874; 482, to the James family, Florence, Jan. 31, 1874. Cor. 5, 455-457, to Karl Hillebrand, Keene Valley, Aug. 10, 1883. *The Nation* 16, Nr. 407, April 24, 1873, 288-290, “*The North American Review* for April.”).

¹⁶Perry 1935, Vol. I, “Foreword,” IX-X, X. For a list of Henry James senior’s friends see p. 31.

¹⁷Gura 2007, *Toward the Genteel Tradition* (297-306). Stressing another father-son sequence in the gradual transformation of American religious thought, that of Nathaniel Langdon Frothingham (1793-1870) and Octavius Brooks Frothingham (1822-1895), with the son becoming the historian of the movement and its prophet of a new “religion of humanity” (299, 301), Gura completes his magisterial survey by turning to George Santayana (1863-1952) and William James (305). And it is James who, for this reader of Gura’s conclusion, plays a major role in the final chapter of the movement. “If truth is,” Gura concludes, “what an individual finds congruent with his experience rather than a deeply shared social ideal, individualism triumphs, as it did in the Gilded Age and beyond. This was the Transcendentalists’ lasting legacy, for better or worse. They were, if nothing else, great optimists” (306). Chief among them, one might add, even if in a latter-day role with his optimism rooted in the “varieties of religious experience,” was William James.

¹⁸Richardson, 364-365: Writing to Henry Rankin, a Massachusetts librarian, as he sent off the ms of his *The Will to Believe* to the publisher in June of 1896, James exclaimed: “I shall work out my destiny; and possibly as a mediator between scientific agnosticism and the religious view of the world (Christian or not) I may be more useful than if I were myself a positive Christian.”

¹⁹See Gerald E. Myers’s “Note on the Texts” to *William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*. In James 1992, 445-704, 1168-1177, 1169-1170.

²⁰James, 1992, *The Will to Believe*, 447-452, 449. The first four essays were entitled: 1) “The Will to Believe” (1896, 457-479); 2) “Is Life Worth Living?” (1895, 480-503); 3) “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879/80, 504-539); 4) “Reflex Action and Theism. (1881, 540-565).

²¹Haym 1880, I, 48, 281-300; II, 531, 554-560. For Hume see SWS 32, 193-197; for a discussion of the sincerity of Herder’s religious commitment see Schneider 1994, 17-28. Schneider questions the sincerity of Herder’s work, “which appears to be based rather on the will to believe than real faith.” “[...]so stellt sich die Frage nach der Aufrichtigkeit seines Schaffens, dem eher der Wille zum Glauben als ein wirklicher Glaube zugrunde zu liegen scheint” (26-27). See Menze 2001, and Menze 2000.

²²SWS XVI, 305-398; SWS XXVIII, 167-246. Poetry: SWS XXVII, 319-328; SWS XXIX, 123-149. See esp. the poems cited in fn. 12. Essays consulted: Vom Wissen und Nichtwissen der Zukunft, and Über Wissen, Ahnen, Wünschen, Hoffen und Glauben. I cite from *FA* 8, 283-296, 297-301.

²³*FA* 9/1, 831: “[...] werden diese Adern des Christentums, *Glaube, Liebe, Hoffnung*, und ihre Wurzel echte *Gewissenhaftigkeit* die einzige und innige *Menschenreligion* bleiben;” 833: Alle diese Wissenschaften müssen zuletzt freilich auf Religion, d.i. auf ein innigstes menschliches Bewußtsein zurückkommen.”

²⁴James 1987, 448-449. “Individuality is founded on feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen and how work is actually done.” For Herder see his “Zum Sinn des Gefühls” in Proß, *Werke* II, 241-250, 884-885, 984-981.

²⁵*The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 7 (Jan. 1909), 278-294. “Concerning Fechner,” in James 1987. *A Pluralistic Universe*, 625-819, 690-710; see also Bruce Kulick, “note on the Texts,” 1350-1359, 1353-1354.

²⁶Fechner 1915. William James, “Introduction to Fechner’s *Life after Death*, in James 1982, 116-119. “Indroduction” by John J. McDermott, xi-xxviii, xix. See also Taylor 1992, 44-52. For Fechner’s connection with Herder see Borgard 1999, 163-229.

²⁷Thomas Borgard, “Der bürgerliche Realismus und die Lebenswissenschaften zwischen Anthropologie, Sinnerzählung und Wissensspaltung– Lotzes Herderrezeption als Paradigma.” In *Herder Jahrbuch/Herder Yearbook*, IX, (2008), 11-36.

²⁸Fechner 1906; Richardson, 458, 498-503; also Gale in Putnam 1997, 60-63. Gale’s thought-provoking arguments about Fechner’s impact on James’s spiritual side merit close attention.

²⁹See footnote 21.

MAKING A LIFE *SIGNIFICANT*: WILLIAM JAMES ON HIGHER EDUCATION AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY

PAMELA C. CROSBY

ABSTRACT

For William James, a principal aim of education in a democracy is to prepare students to become responsible citizens of high moral character who help to counter adverse influences of popular culture, corporate practices, and powerful media on society. An important role of colleges and universities is educating young people to be responsible citizens by guiding them to choose worthy goals and ideals for themselves. In this article, implications of these ideas are presented for current educational practice in light of recent research in the areas of students' success, moral development, and service-learning.

INTRODUCTION

William James's influence pervades much of contemporary American life, and higher education is one of the many areas where he has left his footprints. For James, a principal aim of education in a democracy is to prepare students to become responsible citizens of high moral character who help to counter adverse influences of popular culture, corporate practices, and powerful media on society. An important role of colleges and universities in educating young people is to guide students to create, pursue, and test worthy ideals for themselves while helping to provide them with the best means to achieve these goals. Contemporary research in student development and achievement supports James's claim. In this article, I will draw from James's writings to provide seven characteristics of a worthy ideal. I will discuss the implications of these ideas for current educational practice in light of recent research in the areas of students' success, moral and civic development, and service-learning.

In "Social Value of the College Bred," James (1987b/1908) compared a democratic society to a ship subject to winds of shifting forces produced by decisions, actions, beliefs,

and voices of its people. Citizens choose, for example, their own sources of information, entertainment, and edification, such as newspapers, journals, magazines, and books—what James called the “popular university” (p. 112). Through the choice of media, and the money spent associated with these choices, a nation’s people creates celebrities and public intellectuals, as well as political leaders, who in turn promote other efforts relating to specific interests and values—forming complex interrelationships of influence.

James agreed that naysayers of democracy have properly identified its weakness: when choosing for themselves, individuals will tend to choose what primarily appeals to their self-interest or satisfies their hunger for excitement or both. Voters, for example, often elect leaders who promise them immediate personal benefits and who rouse their interest with convincing rhetoric and dazzling showmanship, so that what makes the *popular university* popular is that it provides amusement rather than illumination. Uncontrolled emotions can eclipse one’s sense of what is fine, excellent, and moral, said James. The combination of “passion” and “prejudice,” for example, led to the wrongful imprisonment of Alfred Dreyfus (1987b/1908, p. 110) in 1894. Paradoxically the will of the people can lead to enslavement, and unrestrained emotions can be devastating forces that hurl the ship of state to shipwreck.

As a means to steer the ship of democracy in favorable directions, James pointed to the “college-bred.” While special interests pull and tug the ship in many directions “amid the driftings of democracy” (1987b/1908 p.110), college graduates, through their leadership and active participation in society assume the pilot’s role. Colleges strive to provide a structure that educates citizens to promote, apply, and evaluate general standards, traditions, and values that were passed down to them, while at the same time, the colleges are a seed bed of new ideas and theories. In addition, the college experience can teach students to become worthy members of society by helping them (a) to recognize admirable goals and actions in others (1908/1987b) and (b) to choose noble goals and actions to which they devote themselves (1899/1983b). “Education, enlarging as it does our horizon and perspective,” said James, “is a means of multiplying our ideals, of bringing new ones into view,” (1899/1983a, p. 163). Thus, helping students to bring new worthy ideals in view that enrich their lives and those of others, that is, to create for themselves significant lives, is an important role of the university.

James did not offer many examples of worthy ideals in his writings, but in essays such as “What Makes a Life Significant” and “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” he provided his audience with some useful characteristics. First, an ideal must be stamped as

truly one's own as a result of personal reflection and experience; it must not be imposed from the outside because a person cannot be sincerely devoted to someone else's ideals (1899/1983a). Second, an ideal must point us into new directions, compelling us to view and experience things differently (1899/1983a). Third, a worthy ideal is something whose pursuit demands our focused attention and dedication (1899/1983a). Fourth, it must be feasible (1911/1979a) but yet pursued with some significant degree of struggle and thus not quickly nor easily attained (1899/1983b). Next, an ideal is something whose achievement must alter one's life in fundamental and constructive ways (1899/1983b). Sixth, an ideal's worthiness must be judged on the basis of its consequences in experience (1899/1983b) and is often altered in light of new knowledge and experience. Finally, the pursuit of a worthy ideal must at least be compatible with others' pursuits of ideals so that there is an achievement of balance of goods for all beings in the world (1891/1979b, 1899/1983b).

BARRIERS TO HELPING STUDENTS TO PURSUE THEIR IDEALS

Helping students to pursue their ideals and interests is a difficult challenge for the college and university, however. For one thing, because an *all-inclusive* knowledge and appreciation of others' inner lives are impossible, what we see is only "partial," and we fail to understand many significant aspects of experience in various venues and versions (1899/1983a), including those of our students .

Second, as "practical" persons, we are in the business of taking care of our own responsibilities, and we tend to value what relates to our lives over what relates to others' lives (1899/1983a). Concern for the other as an individual tends to decrease in the context of an institution or organization, argued James. As the size of an institution increases, so does its individuals' preoccupation with institutional responsibilities and the myriad policies and practices that are involved, a phenomenon that James often called *bigness*. In his essays on education he frequently pointed a critical finger at unyielding institutional structures with their fragmentations of disciplines and emphasis on technical rules and procedures that suppress those students who envision alternative and more creative ways of looking at the world (1903/1987c; 1903/1987a). Consequently, determining what the students' interests, needs, and aspirations are, as well as helping them to realize those aspirations, is increasingly neglected or impeded (1903/1987a).

For example, James often expressed concern that he saw young scholars in the US aping their professors who had been trained in German institutions. He indicated his

displeasure that in some institutions where departments of philosophy had become so professionalized, professors talked only to fellow professors and others who were sympathetic with their own theories and models (1909/1977), thus encouraging students merely to repeat the ideas of others without questioning them or thinking for themselves. He noted that students who were not encouraged to think for themselves simply followed the bad habits of their professors by making the merits of any claim dependent, not on the degree of empirical truth of the claim, but only on the prestige of the one who pronounced it.

In contrast to playing these “rules of the game” as James called it, he often challenged and went out of his way to encourage his students to think for themselves (Angell, 1996), and he bore criticism from young people of his own ideas with “inexhaustible patience” and “*human attention*” (Miller, 1996, pp. 125-126). While at times younger students criticized James for his informal approach because they had little chance of merely repeating lectures on tests and assignments, they would later praise him because he had moved them to think on their own (Boodin, 1996).

James also argued that students should be exposed to worthy actions and goals of others in many different contexts in order that they might emulate a general sense of worthiness—but in distinctive ways that they choose for themselves. One way students can be exposed to pluralistic notions of worthy goals and aims, he noted, is through the study of biographies, histories, and literature. These works abound with examples of heroes and heroines from all walks of life, social classes, ethnic groups, and cultures (1908/1987b). Adding human elements, what James called “*humanistic values*” (p. 107), or the historical-biographical-cultural-dimension of human life, to various disciplines such as geography and mathematics provides insights into the struggles, failures, and accomplishments of human experience.

Another way that young people can be exposed to pluralistic goals and aims is through the involvement of community service. Although James did not suggest in his essay “The Moral Equivalent of War” (1910/1982) that civic engagement be a requirement of a *college* education, his call for a non-military national conscription of youth in this essay expresses an attitude that would be sympathetic with such a requirement. James proposed that young people go to work side by side with those in the community who perform heavy physical labor or menial tasks and that doing so would “get the childishness knocked out of them” (p. 172). Instilling in young people the habit of aligning with some worthy cause, James argued, is a means of building their character, increasing their hardiness, and

expanding their tolerance of others' perspectives. By learning to sacrifice for others and becoming part of a larger force with which they can identify with pride, youth would be able to nurture virtues in themselves such as responsibility, cooperation, unselfishness, perseverance, courage, and self-discipline.¹

Assuming various roles in the community helps to prepare them to be citizens and leaders in a democratic society, which requires contributions from many different sorts of leaders, activists, thinkers, and doers. James cautions that it is crucial to understand that superior individuals come in various "wrappings" and labels or without any labels at all (1908/1987b, p. 111). And new ideas can ferment in the least expected locales and from the most surprising people (1899/1983a; 1899/1983b). Providing students opportunities to learn from others without judging those others on their outward or superficial packaging such as appearance, lack of sophisticated language, or other accidental properties can teach them to take the time to uncover the excellence in human beings that may be hidden (1908/1987b).

James, therefore, argued for a holistic educational experience that exposes students to many different kinds of activities, fields, disciplines, courses, and resources.

CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH

Teaching students to recognize human flourishing, by adding what James called "humanistic values" in a field or discipline, as in historical-biographical-literary contexts (1899/1983b), has large support in contemporary research (Glanzer & Ream, 2009; Chickering, Dalton, & Stamm, 2006; Palmer & Zajonc, 2010). What James seems to have meant might be explained by *identity formation* (Glanzer & Ream, 2009). Each individual has many identities that are connected by a guiding identity or *meta-identity*, which gives meaning and purpose to one's lived existence, while ordering other identities in one's life. In times of identity conflict, it is the meta-identity that guides the individual to choose the identity to which she is most loyal. Meta-narratives (in stories, histories, and so on) help to shape the moral identity by means of their influence on what qualities, virtues, and beliefs the person thinks would make up the ideal self.

Frequently administrators and faculty do not focus on this type of identity formation because they often cannot agree on what aspects define human identity and what it means to be a good human being. Instead, institutions, on the whole, focus on those aspects that define the more narrow identities (on which they can agree): for example, a trained mathematician or geologist. University leaders and faculty can also largely agree on what specific values,

methods, and role models can aid students in their development of these narrow forms of identity. In turn, the majority of universities have shifted away from “fully human” educational approaches (Glanzer & Ream, 2009, p. 3), which were a central focus of education institutions in the past. The approaches included those policies, curricula, and practices whose purpose is to help students to become good human beings.

While narrow types of identity formation are necessary for educating young people to succeed in various vocational aspects of their lives, Glanzer and Ream argued that educational institutions who promote *only* these forms of identity formation fail to address the multidimensional aspects of human experience. As a result, universities communicate to students that an educated and thriving person’s meta-identity is, for example, reduced to successful student, scholar, or professional, not good human being, and thus all other identities are subsumed under the narrow identity. When moral conflicts arise, the meta-identity takes over, and its powerful influence may cause the individual to seek to succeed in a vocation at all costs—including condoning or performing actions that are unethical.

Glanzer and Ream (2009) wrote that higher education leaders and faculty should make choices about policies, programs, and curricula based on a deep appreciation of the rich and complex concept of human flourishing that would result in offering a wide scope of *human* approaches—such as curricula and co-curricula that would be rich in the historical, biographical, and literary narratives (as James had argued for), which help to shape the human meta-identity of students

James’s determination to coax from students their own ideas and encourage them to choose ideals for themselves also receives much empirical support from contemporary research in college student development theory. Baxter Magolda’s research on *self-authorship* (e.g., 1992, 2009, 2009b, 2009c) examined the different stages of development of college students in relation to the way they process and construct information, deal with ambiguity, and contend with authority, and she proposed ways that programs and practices, both inside and outside the classroom, can help students to become more independent thinkers, learners, and actors.

Baxter Magolda (2009c) asserted that self-authorship is evident when individuals can have confidence in themselves to analyze and evaluate information from external sources and deal with uncertainty—not just rely on perceived authorities—in order to make wise choices. Those who author their learning have the ability to perceive the complexity of knowledge while seeing the need to apply their own perspectives, at the same time collaborating with

others—acts that add personal meaning to the learning process. Crucial in this stage is the ability to have “interdependence,” that is, being able to rely on others for various reasons, to share opinions, consider others’ perspectives, while being willing to change one’s own perspectives and to challenge others’ ideas or expectations without the fear of losing one’s own self-identity (Baxter Magolda, 2009a; Parks, 2000). Encouragement of self-authorship of students’ learning is furthered in the following ways: showing respect for students’ ideas and feelings; encouraging them to interpret their experiences as educational opportunities; collaborating with them in problem solving while sharing the learning experience with them; focusing their attention to the complexity of their life’s work and decision-making while discouraging simplistic resolutions; empowering them to make choices about their lives; and helping them to work interdependently with others to solve common problems (Baxter Magolda, 2009b; 2009c).

Students must not only make academic decisions in college, but they also must make independent choices about how to live with others and what sort of career paths they take, as well as how to prioritize their personal values. But Baxter Magolda (2004) argued that students’ complex transformation from merely depending on external authority to relying on internal judgment takes the whole university community—faculty cannot do it on their own.

Baxter Magolda (2004) suggested that faculty and student affairs leaders form *learning partnerships* that can help bring about the conditions that encourage students to develop self-authorship. Student affairs leaders work with students in various facets of college life: community service and civic/political engagement; multicultural affairs; residence living; leadership; judicial rights and responsibilities; sororities and fraternities; interfaith cooperation and dialogue, and so on.

These partnerships are needed in all higher education settings but especially in public universities, with large class sizes, the type of educational institutions that are much more financially accessible to the majority of students but whose lack of attention to individuals’ needs and interests has been found by researchers to be detrimental to student success and well-being (Hamrick, Evans, & Schuh, 2002; Kuh, Kinzie, Schuh, Whitt, & Associates, 2005; Baxter Magolda, 1992; Dalton, 1998). These findings that measure what is referred to as human scale and psychological size reflect what James referred to as the harmful effects of bigness.

One particular type of campus partnership that has been highly successful in many ways is service-learning. Service-learning involves linking academic and student affairs

efforts while connecting the inside-outside classroom experience. Butin (2010) defined service-learning as a “linkage of academic coursework with community-based service within the framework of respect, reciprocity, relevance, and reflection” (p.1).

Service-learning is distinguished from other outside-the-classroom experiences such as co-op education, internships, and practicums because its aim is to promote civic skills and attitudes (Battistoni, 2000; Bringle & Hatcher, 2009). It is distinguished from community outreach and volunteer programs, as well as student service clubs and organizations, because it integrates academic practices and course content with community service activities in the framework of structured learning outcomes (Zlotkowski, 1996; Bringle & Hatcher, 2009). James’s essay “The Moral Equivalent of War” is often cited as a major theoretical influence on service-learning programs. On its website, National Service-Learning Clearinghouse (NSLC) pointed to James in its timeline as helping, along with John Dewey, in “developing intellectual foundations to service-based learning” (NSLC, n.d.) and specifically cited “Moral Equivalent” as a primary inspiration of the establishment of service-learning organizations. The essay was credited with inspiring the founding of the training camp for the Civilian Conservation Corps, which in turn served as a model for the Peace Corps, VISTA, and Americorps—and subsequently many national service organizations that exist today (Gower, 1965; Roland, n.d.).

Along with an increase of service-learning courses, programs, disciplines, and initiatives (Butin, 2010), research on the effect of service-learning involvement on students’ ethical decision-making, civic engagement, and appreciation and toleration of difference in others provides a window into its role in student development and learning. Jones and Abes (2004) connected the potential of service-learning experience with self-identity reflection and self-authorship; service-learning experience can help form a more integrated identity while encouraging personal and social responsibility.

By and large, service-learning engagement impacts educational, personal, social, and civic behaviors (Conway, 2009), promotes teamwork and leadership skills, and fosters intergroup relationships (Svinicki, 2004; Levesque-Bristol & Stanek, 2009). Service-learning has been an important means of re-igniting civic and political engagement in college and university students (Benson, Harkavy, & Puckett, 2007; Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, & Corngold, 2007; Butin, 2010). In terms of attitudes, it brings about changes in perceptions regarding those whom one serves (Conway, 2009). For example, in one study those who participated in an immersion service trip indicated that they experienced a considerable

increase in compassion toward others in contrast to those who did not participate. Students who demonstrate considerable empathy as a result of such activities may do so because they have undergone more tangible ways of experiencing how varying conditions of individuals' lives may affect their ideas and behaviors (Plante, Lackey, & Hwang, 2009).

In addition, service-learning can often position students in roles where they assume more responsibility in their learning experience while maintaining supportive interactions with faculty and fellow students, and the combination of autonomy and nurturing relationships contributes to positive effects of service-learning (Levesque-Bristol & Stanek, 2009). One of the most significant aspects of this type of engagement is the continuous interchange of ideas and conversations that cut across perceived differences which occur during the time of the experience as well as during the reflection afterward, involving those being served, fellow-students who serve, and supervisors, faculty, and peers with whom students are connected (Keen & Hall, 2009).

Confronting difference can also create conditions where students challenge traditional beliefs that they have taken for granted. Questioning assumptions often changes attitudes and points of view (Mezirow, 1991). In addition, when students' engagement is at particularly high levels, their ethical decision making abilities are positively affected (Hoyt, 2008).

The Women's Studies Program at the University of Central Florida is an example of a service-learning program where civic engagement much as James describes in "Moral Equivalent" provides a fundamental link between the program's undergraduate academic interdisciplinary approaches (similar to James's account of historical biographical studies, i.e., the "human element") and the Orlando community and beyond. To complete their service-learning requirement for each course, students spend fifteen hours in community service and design a project, present their work to their fellow students, and write a reflective essay relating their community experiences with course context. Participating in a weekly blog allows them to share their reactions with their fellow students and instructor (Crosby, 2010).

One focus of the academic/service-learning experience is the examination of women's roles in both historical and contemporary life. At the same time students are studying the ways social and political structures are understood in terms of how they shape and are shaped by women's roles in society, students actively engage in experiences in the community that directly relate to the subject matter of their courses. As students interpret what it would be like to assume the roles of the women with whom they engage in service, they are also

exploring what roles they see themselves as assuming in the complex society in which they live. Opportunities for service experience range from tutoring at-risk young girls to serving as a victim advocate, to engaging in campus and community activism (Crosby, 2010).

Not all scholars support the argument that service-learning or any other higher education program should include moral and civic development of college students as a focus. Some critics, such as Stanley Fish, argued that thinking that a college education can prepare one for a moral life is confusing one set of values (i. e., academic ones) with another set of values, and this confusion can be detrimental to the quality of education (Fish, 2003, 2008). Egger (2008) maintained that service-learning is a practice that by means of appealing to students' emotions indoctrinates them to behave in certain ways according to a pre-accepted value system. A university's purpose is to train the mind, not to promote emotional reactions (Egger, 2008).

Exley (2008) contended that the downside of requiring students to become involved in community work is that supervisory adults who are involved, such as faculty, staff, or administrators, are often unqualified to deal with student developmental issues that arise when students encounter emotionally charged settings. Some faculty admit that sometimes neither students nor their teachers are always able to handle effectively the consequences when students confront the darker side of life—which can happen when they volunteer in the community (Welch, 2010). Exley (2008) argued that service-learning experiences may often center on conventional, prescribed outcomes such as voting and volunteering, but may not be intellectually stimulating to the point that ignites students to think critically about their responsibilities to society.

Furthermore, it is a challenging task to measure outcomes of service-learning experience. Research points to the fact that such involvement may influence students in numerous ways, in many different degrees, and at different points in life. Deeley (2010) emphasized that any sort of educational change from any college experience may not be noticeable or realized until years after the involvement; on the other hand, what may be construed as transformative in the college years may be only momentary.

Finally, the wide range of service-learning programs includes those with little structure to those that are highly organized academic programs, and research continues to compose a larger and more detailed description of the most effective characteristics of program types and leaders and others involved in the process (Butin, 2010).

CONCLUSION

James, in responding to critics such as Fish (2008) and others who insist that academia should not focus on creating moral civic leaders, would argue that in order to seek to have a deep understanding of the meaning of *student*, and of the education needs of a student, one must consider what the student experiences in her day-to-day world as a physical, emotional, social, and rational being. As we have seen, research in effective educational practices increasingly supports the Jamesian notion that the educational environment should cultivate the multi-dimensions of the self—helping to integrate self, world, others, and notions. Astin and Astin (2010) argued that universities should recognize that in addition to an exterior life of students that can be observed, measured, and tested, students also possess an inner life of emotions, anticipations, values, and ideals, as well as rational judgment, and much contemporary research suggests that one's academic performance both shapes and is shaped by this inner life. In turn, research also points to the necessity for educationists who serve different roles in the campus community to enter into partnerships that nurture students' confidence in their own individuality. Student development scholars contend that most young adults enter college life just at the point when they are trying to discover who they are and how they fit into a world much larger than they had earlier experienced.

Service-learning programs, as well as other campus-wide programs that have the potential to influence the development of students' critical decision making skills at higher levels, can lead them to consider the interests, wants, and needs of others while building in them the confidence and maturity to make decisions on their own. These types of program also help to increase the human scale of educational institutions that is vital for students' well-being. Like many other educational initiatives, service-learning has "an implied character development dimension that is defined by particular core moral values" (Dalton & Crosby, 2010). These core moral values, similar to those James described in "Moral Equivalent," include respect for others, appreciation of human differences, service, citizenship, and industry. In addition to recognizing that the education of young persons is a vital end in itself, James argued that education is also an instrumental good for democracy because it can provide qualified and knowledgeable leaders and participants in civic life.

The higher education setting is an organic whole of complex structures and processes, where persons have multiple interrelationships, needs, and perspectives. It has the potential to offer students the rich pluralistic experience for which James pleads. Once responding to a

student who thought James would be pleased that he was going to enroll only in philosophy classes to obtain his degree at Harvard, his wise professor quipped: “Jones, don’t you philosophize on an empty stomach!” (Palmer, 1996, p. 31).

In a sense, James’s vision of a pluralistic *universe* (1909/1977) is reflected in the pluralistic *university*. The college campus, he would say, should be a place for young people to try out their thoughts and ideas in a living laboratory that includes the guidance and support from caring adults who demand from students their best efforts. With such guidance, they can create and test for themselves the ideals that they hope will make their lives and those of others significant.

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NOTES

¹ James tended to refer to admirable virtues as “manly” in many of his writings (Townsend, 1996). The virtues he extolled in “Moral Equivalent of War” (1910/1982) are examples of “manly virtues” of the “military party” (p. 172).

WILLIAM JAMES ON ETHICS AND FAITH by Michael R. Slater. Cambridge University Press, 2009. 247 pgs. \$93 (hbk).

This is William James interpretation at its best. It displays a thorough mastery of the text and makes effective use of the vast secondary source literature. But, even more important, it manages to be both severely critical and yet highly sympathetic, no small feat. The former brings out numerous difficulties due to apparent inconsistencies, over emphases, and unclarities in James's text. The latter attempts to extricate James from these difficulties so that he winds up with a very attractive philosophy, at least by Slater's lights, though Slater honestly owns up to outstanding difficulties that still remain in his reconstructed, beautified James.

Slater's main concern is with the relation between James's accounts of morality and religion and he manages to significantly advance the extant literature on this topic, so much so that it is safe to predict that Slater will be one of the major players in any future discussions. Slater claims that all of James interpreters have failed to bring out the deep interconnections between his religion and morality, and it is the aim of Slater's book to remedy this deficiency. In particular, Slater wants to show that for James "the highest forms of human moral agency and flourishing cannot be had apart from leading a religious life" and that furthermore "the possibility of their achievement is partly contingent upon our willingness to believe and act upon our beliefs...in the existence and assistance of superhuman forces" (13). It is here that James's famous doctrine of the will to believe enters the picture for it makes it permissible to acquire such a belief even in the absence of supporting evidence or arguments for its truth.

The first two chapters are devoted to showing how this doctrine renders it legitimate to have an evidentially unsupported religious belief. Slater begins with a close to the text exposition of it from the 1896 essay "The Will to Believe" according to which one has a right or lawfully may believe an evidentially nonwarranted proposition provided it is a live, momentous, and forced option for this person to do so. Slater offers a friendly reconstruction of James that recognizes this set of four conditions as sufficient

but denies that either momentousness or being forced is necessary, thereby giving a wider range of application for will to believe options.

Slater gives a bogus argument in support of his denial of the necessity of being forced.

If I ask you to believe in James's hypothesis of an unseen order or go without it I have presented you with a forced option, but if I ask you to declare James's hypothesis true or false I have not. The way in which I have put the option to you is different in these two cases, but the content of the belief is the same. Does this mean that a person potentially has an epistemic right to believe in the first case but never in the second? This consequence seems...absurd (34).

Slater fails to realize that the second option is different from the first. Whereas the first is a belief option, the second is an overt action option, namely declaring the hypothesis to be true (false). Notice that one can declare a proposition to be true without believing it.

It is interesting to consider why James presented his beefed up version of the will to believe rather than Slater's trimmed down version. One of the reasons might concern the dialectical context of his essay. It is an attempt to produce clear-cut, dramatic counter-examples to Clifford's universal moral prohibition against having an evidentially nonwarranted belief. And having the momentous and forced requirements certainly makes his counter-examples more compelling. Slater's trimmed down version omits what gives persuasive force to James' version, namely that by acquiring a belief on the basis of the will to believe helps to promote the attainment of some desired good. Slater allows one to acquire a belief just for the pleasurable feelings it occasions, and this is quite alien to James's will to believe.

There is another possible reason for his including the requirements of forcedness and momentousness and thus making it more difficult and far less frequent to have a will to believe option. Clifford's major argument for it never being morally permissible to have an evidentially nonwarranted belief is typical of the way in which utilitarians try to neutralize counter-examples. They argue that although the agent might maximize utility in the short run, she acts in a way that will inculcate in her a habit that will prove disastrous in the long run. Thus we find Clifford arguing that the person who allows

herself even a single evidentially nonwarranted belief runs the danger of becoming credulous, even a liar and a cheat, and this will have very bad long-term future consequences for both herself and her community. By making it difficult to have a will to believe option, James is making it far less likely that the believer will become credulous. James's dialectical strategy is to give Clifford as much rope as he can before he hangs him with a really convincing counter-example.

There is still more to be said. It is important to distinguish *acquiring* from *retaining* a nonmomentous belief that is epistemically nonwarranted. We have many such beliefs that were acquired in the past without epistemic warrant, but it would not be cost effective to try and eliminate them. What we must avoid, if Clifford's utilitarian argument has any merit, and it has but not to the extent Clifford thought, is not to acquire such beliefs, for this is what will help to mold our future character in the wrong way.

One of the salutary features of Slater's exposition is the manner in which he protects the will to believe from the oft made objection that it licenses wishful thinking. Toward this end he distinguishes the psychological claims James makes about the human will and those that establish the right to believe. This really is a distinction between the causes of a belief and its justification.

But just what sort of a justification does a will to believe option furnish? Slater holds it to be an epistemological one. He speaks of being "epistemically justified," having an "epistemic right"(25), as well as its being "epistemically permissible (32), to believe when confronted with the conditions that constitute a will to believe option. "It is the *evidential inconclusiveness* of our [will to believe option] which gives us our *epistemic warrant*, and the liveness or deadness of our options which, according to our passional nature, guides our decision to believe one option or another" (my italics: 34. see also 49 and 63).

This interpretation must be wrong for it makes James's will to believe doctrine contradictory: First it says that the proposition in question is "evidentially inconclusive" but then goes on to add that the subject of the will to believe option has an "epistemic warrant" to believe it! Fortunately, James text makes it very clear that the sort of warrant for belief that a will to believe option supplies is a moral one, and it is very surprising

that Slater did not see this, given that he is one of the most conscientious and careful of all James interpreters.

In order to see that it is the moral sense of warrant and permission that is supplied by James's will to believe, we must again begin with the dialectical setting of his "Will to Believe" essay. Its purpose is to refute Clifford's claim that it is always wrong to believe upon insufficient evidence. That he meant "morally wrong" is made manifest from the title of his essay, "The Ethics of Belief," and by what he explicitly says about the morally disastrous consequences of having an evidentially nonwarranted belief. Furthermore, if he meant "epistemically wrong" his universal prohibition would be the empty tautology that it is epistemically wrong to have an epistemically wrong belief, since having an epistemically wrong belief is the same as having an evidentially nonwarranted belief. To refute Clifford, James must show that in certain circumstances we are morally permitted or justified in having an evidentially unsupported belief, and his will to believe doctrine spells out these circumstances. For James, justification and rationality are generic concepts that have as species epistemic and moral justification and rationality. Other species are practical or pragmatic justification.

It should be pointed out that there are some special cases, but they are exceptional, in which making a decision to believe does give epistemic warrant for the belief. These are cases in which the subject of the belief can make the believed proposition become true and is so psychologically constituted that she will do so in virtue of having the belief. An example would be the you-will-like-me case in which the subject of the belief will act in a way that will make you like her if and only if she first has the belief that you will like her. Prior to her forming the belief she lacks epistemic warrant for the proposition that you will like her but acquires it subsequent to her believing.

Although Slater's interpretation of James's will to believe as supplying epistemic warrant is a serious blunder, it is easily rectified. All that needs to be done is to replace his use of "epistemic (epistemological)" throughout with "moral." In the most important case of a will to believe option, the option to believe that good will win out over evil in the long run, which James takes to be a universal feature of all religions, the epistemic warrant of the belief gets raised only the tiniest bit by having the belief; for, one person's

having the disposition to perform good-making actions as a result of believing this proposition does very little to raise its probability.

In Chapter 2, Slater develops a version of James's Wager (from the appendix to James's 1911 *Some Problems of Philosophy*) that attempts to improve upon Pascal because it does not confine our religious option to a single hypothesis, that being the Catholic one for Pascal. James works with his own pet religious hypothesis, the pluralistic-melioristic one, in which unseen supernatural powers cooperate with us to bring about the world's salvation, the eventual conquest of good over evil, with there being only the possibility, not the certainty, of success.

Slater objects that "it is not clear why James's saving unseen order and the melioristic universe that it makes possible should be more *rational* than other types of religious belief" (59). This objection runs through open doors since James is the first to admit that his pet religious hypothesis is epistemically on all fours with a host of rival religious hypotheses. By believing and living in accordance with your passions and emotions you come out a winner, even if your hypothesis is false, for you are living a life that has value and meaning for yourself. It really should not be called a wager since you win no matter what. Slater gets this right when he writes that "*if* one already believes in the existence of supernatural beings or powers, *then* it is more reasonable to trust them" (60). I agree with Slater that James would have done better if had had eschewed entirely giving a wager type argument and instead gave a will to believe justification for believing one's pet religious hypothesis.

Chapter 3 gives an in depth exposition of James's 1891 essay "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life." As usual, Slater gives a meticulous exposition and manages to take some well aimed potshots at a host of commentators along the way. It is only in the final section of the essay that an attempt is made to find a connection between morality and religion. Having already established that we are always morally obligated to act in a way that maximizes desire (or demand) satisfaction, he brings in God as giving us the inspirational goose that we need to fully live up to this obligation, for it is one thing to have and recognize an obligation and another thing to fully live up to it. God does this because he has an infinite scale of value. No commentator, including Slater, has been

able to make sense of this. Since James's God is finite, what could it mean to say that he has an infinite scale of values?

I do think that with some anachronistic imagination some sense can be made of this. Although God is only finite, he still is outstandingly powerful and smart, so smart that he knows the answer to the question of how we can maximize desire-satisfaction. We cannot access the Divine mind according to James. However, our social scientists, who are the people we must turn to find an answer to this question, which is the reason Dewey praised James's essay so highly, would be inspired to do their best if they believed that there is a correct answer and God has it. This is analogous to our natural scientists finding inspiration in the belief that there is, as Einstein thought, a uniquely correct answer to how nature works. This point will be important for Slater's account of James as a metaphysical realist in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 4 deals with James's solution to religiously based pessimism upon his pluralistic-melioristic faith. There is a fascinating discussion of the similarities and differences between James's pessimism and Nietzsche's nihilism. Religiously based pessimism results from one having a traditional theistic belief that is seriously challenged by the prevalence of apparently unjustified evil and various intellectual considerations that arise from science. There are two solutions. The first involves leading the morally strenuous life but giving up one's traditional theistic belief, the other leading the morally strenuous life coupled with a faith in his pluralistic-melioristic hypothesis. The latter is James's favored solution because it does a better job of promoting human flourishing and leading the morally strenuous life.

Slater raises several devastating objections to this solution. He begins by pointing out that James's God is only finite in power, unlike the omnipotent God of traditional theism, and thereby can escape the problem of evil. But if he is made too powerless, he ceases to be a suitable object of religious faith. And if he is made powerful enough to play this role, his existence becomes incompatible with evil (105). What a beautiful argument! A variant on it, championed by Antony Flew, is the unfalsifiability objection. By making God only finitely powerful, no matter how much horrendous evil we are confronted with we can always say, "He is powerful but just not *that* powerful."

But Slater's most powerful objection is yet to come. James fails to show that "leading a religious moral life provides, if not for *all* persons, then at least for *most* persons, a superior way of relieving pessimism and despair than leading a moral life alone" (107). James is guilty of making a hasty generalization from his own case. He makes no effort to gather empirical evidence to support his claim that people in general do better by having his pluralistic-melioristic faith than a more traditional theistic faith (108). Slater extends this objection to James's will to believe justification of religious faith in his pluralistic-melioristic hypothesis.

Slater's objection can be made even more powerful. There is a reason why James did not think it necessary for him to present empirical evidence in support of his generalization from his own case. It is because he believed there was a one to one correlation between belief and action such that everyone who believes a given proposition performs and/or is disposed to perform the same set of actions. That he was committed to this false one-to-one correlation thesis is made clear in his infamous footnote at the end of "The Will to Believe."

If the action required by the religious hypothesis is in no way different from that dictated by the naturalistic hypothesis, then religious faith is a pure superfluity, better pruned away, and controversy about its legitimacy is a piece of idle trifling, unworthy of serious minds.

Slater quotes this passage on pages 46-7 but fails to see its commitment to the correlation thesis.

Given the severity and, in my opinion, effectiveness of Slater's preceding objections, it raises a question of whether he has succeeded in adequately in supporting the underlying thesis of his book.

While I believe that certain features of James's account are problematic and should be modified or rejected, his basic argument that there are certain moral goods which cannot plausibly be accounted for, or are not plausibly achievable under the terms of a naturalistic moral theory is a good argument, even if it does not win universal acceptance (15).

It is hard to evaluate how successfully Slater has defended his thesis since it is stated in a vague and highly qualified manner. There are too many out there who flourish and lead the morally strenuous life, such as Russell and Dewey, who eschew any super naturalistic beliefs. Russell was willing to go to jail for his moral commitments whereas James ducked service in the Civil War. Although Slater has failed to support his thesis, he has done a good job of defending James's doctrine of the will to believe.

Chapter 5, which is the major chapter of the book, being 52 pages long, gives a very thorough and penetrating critical exposition of religion and morality in James's 1902 *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Space limitations require that I give only a bare bones summary. James's earlier essays considered the beneficial consequences of faith alone but in this book he enriches faith with religious and mystical experiences. His major test for the veridicality of these experiences is the favorable moral and spiritual progress that the subject of them displays, and he gives a colossal array of empirical evidence to support his claim that these experiences, by and large, have such desirable moral consequences, which was something that he neglected to do in support of his thesis that religious faith has such consequences. Another improvement is that whereas his earlier work was confined to James's pet pluralistic-melioristic religious hypothesis he now countenances religious pluralism. God is identified with the object of mystical experience, but he permits there to be numerous "over-beliefs," which are metaphysical theories about the nature of the object of a mystical experience.

What Slater finds most laudatory about *Varieties* is its unabashed commitment to religious realism. That God has an objective existence that is independent of us also informs his earlier essays in which God is said to be a powerful supernatural force(s); for only an objectively existent being can be a causal agent. He develops a perceptual model of mystical experiences, which has the consequence that a mystical experience is a dyadic relation between a subject and an objective accusative. Slater failed to see that this seriously limits James's pluralism. Because it makes a numerical distinction between the subject and object of a mystical experience, it precludes the monistic religious belief of Eastern mystics for whom there is an identity between the subject and object of a mystical experience. James's disagreement with these monistic mystics is not over their

respective over-beliefs but over the nature of the mystical experience itself. It is strange that James's account of a mystical experience precluded them, since many of his examples of mystical experiences are of the monistic sort.

Having successfully shown that James is a religious realist, Slater goes on in the next chapter to show that, for James, "there is a world of mind-independent objects" (186). This is called "metaphysical realism" by Slater and "epistemological realism" by James. Slater finds this doctrine in James's account of truth. Slater is a very honest interpreter and he squarely faces all of the difficulties in James's account, especially its inconsistencies. James's usually is interpreted as holding that a true belief is one that guides us successfully in realizing our goals, and there are numerous quotations from the text to support this interpretation. That truth is nothing but utility brought on the critical ire of a large part of the philosophical community, led by Moore, Russell, and Lovejoy. Slater produces a ton of quotes from *Pragmatism* and especially *The Meaning of Truth* to show that James added a correspondence requirement to that of utility, resulting in a conjunctive analysis of truth in terms of utility and correspondence with reality.

The problem that immediately comes to mind with this conjunctive account is whether the second conjunct, the correspondence with reality requirement, violates James's ardent life-long commitment to empiricism. If nothing more is said about the nature of this correspondence relation, it will appear to be an occult, salutatory relation of the sort that James scorned. James is well aware of this danger for he adds that "pragmatism defines "agreeing" to mean certain ways of "working," be they actual or potential" (212; my italics). Slater reiterates James's remark when he says that pragmatism specifies "what it *means* for a belief or statement to 'correspond' with reality" (214; my italics). The agreement conjunct thereby reduces to the utility conjunct, differing from it only in name, resulting in James's analysis being based on utility alone.

I think there is a way for Slater to save the conjunctive analysis but it requires some softening of James's commitment to empiricism. There were occasions when James admitted to the dance an idea that was not empirically vouchsafed because of its explanatory value. Slater seems to treat agreement as such an idea for he stresses its explanatory value in the following quotation. "James's views on the connection between truth and utility are underwritten by his belief in a real, objective world which serves as

the condition for the *possibility* of an idea's being true and useful" (184; my italics). He gives a quotation from James that also seems to treat agreement as an explanatory concept. "[That practically useful ideas] should be true in advance of and apart from their utility, that, in other words, their objects should really be there, is the very condition of their having that kind of utility" (185). It also can be said on behalf of this explanatory interpretation of agreement that it can be serve as a spur to certain researchers to believe that there is an objective reality that our true ideas must agree with, just as the belief that the solution to the question of how to best maximize desire satisfaction is known by God can inspire our social scientists.

Slater's conjunctive interpretation of James's theory of truth succeeds in deflecting criticisms based on our common sense way of thinking about truth. But has he really done James a favor? I think not. James is sufficiently rich and inconsistent that an interpreter can portray him in an exciting or unexciting manner. Slater definitely is of the latter type. His interpretation is of the ho-hum, trivializing sort that gives a Misunderstanding Theory of the history of philosophy. All of the shooting that was occasioned by James's account of truth rested on a misunderstanding. First, James was too much of a muddle head to give a clear presentation and his interpreters weren't sharp enough to see what he really meant or intended. Slater's interpretation shows that there was no need for that gun fight at the O K Corral. Santayana insightfully remarked that James was a like a bird that soared high in the air only to be pulled back to earth by invisible wires. Slater is all too happy to pull on those wires and it is apt that he used James's *The Meaning of Truth* as his major source since it is a large-scale exercise in wire pulling -- James at his worst. A similar story can be told about Dewey interpretation.

I personally favor the exciting interpretation of James, such as I gave in my *The Divided Self of William James*. The exciting James, the one who richly deserves a place in the Philosophy Hall of Fame in Steubenville, Ohio, is the one who gave a bold, original revisionary moralization of epistemology, common sense be damned. It is a highly original and controversial theory but the history of philosophy is best served by these sorts of contributions. The greatness of a philosopher should be measured by how much controversy and discussion he or she provokes, for it is by this that philosophy progresses. By this criterion, James is one of the all-time greats.

The book ends in a beautifully conceived and written Epilogue that rightfully portrays James's importance for the contemporary world on the basis of his passionate and moving defense of pluralism and ecumenicalism. What our world desperately needs is a good shot of William James. Amen!

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IMAGINING MINDS: THE NEURO-AESTHETICS OF AUSTEN, ELIOT, AND HARDY by Kay Young. Ohio State University Press, 2010. 218 pgs. \$25.75 (pb)

Kay Young's *Imagining Lives* is as creative and rewarding as her title is apt and resonant: Young is at work imagining the minds of three 19th century novelists – Austen, Eliot, Hardy – as they imagine characters that are sometimes mentally sure-footed, more often faltering, sometimes blinded or deaf to what is external to their own egos, sometimes seemingly unconscious of themselves as selves. Young claims “that the novel writes about the nature of mind, narrates it at work, and stimulates us to know deepened experiences of consciousness in its touching of our own integrated minds.” Thus the novel does the “mind-work” of joining the narrator and the character with the reader as it evokes self-consciousness. Closely reflecting upon boundaries and interpenetrabilities among the characters’ external worlds as well as among characters, their minds and their senses of themselves, Young employs the insights of William James and the neurologist Antonio Damasio to underpin her incisive readings. Beginning with James’s *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), Young works to establish important parallels between theoretical and fictional representations of the mind.

Starting from an introductory chapter, Young delineates the territory she wishes to explore and begins to fill in the psychological landscape within which the novels develop. The book is divided into three parts: “Jane Austen and Self-Consciousness,” with particular focus on *Emma* and *Persuasion*, where the radically different consciousnesses of Emma and Anne Elliot are especially instructive early in the book; “George Eliot and Other-Consciousness” in which Young studies *Middlemarch* and *Daniel Deronda*, in the former focusing innovatively on sound rather than, as is more typically argued, sight as the dominant sense differentiating characters’ consciousnesses, and in the latter offering a fascinating argument about metaphor as the central instrument of that novel’s consciousnesses. Finally, in “Thomas Hardy and Nonintrospective Consciousness,” Young focuses on Sue Bridehead from *Jude, the Obscure*, and the eponymous Tess Durbeyfield.

In moving her reader’s attention from these two “embodied,” hardly self-conscious women toward her concluding chapter that considers the relation between brain and mind -- the mind-body dichotomy -- Young dwells on Tess’s mouth – its sound, its shape, its lips; the image

of the mouth is powerfully evocative for representing various relations between the self and other, even of course the primal relation of self and mother which Young discusses in evolutionary terms.

Though Young begins her study of the novels with an illustrative scene centered on the self-deceiving Emma Woodhouse, Jane Austen provides another moment which encompasses what seems to me central to Young's project *throughout* the book by highlighting self-consciousness in mid-transition. This is the familiar, indeed key moment in *Pride and Prejudice* when Elizabeth Bennet, having come to Darcy's Pemberley before he unexpectedly returns, is touring the home with her relatives the Gardiners under the guidance of Darcy's housekeeper. They are in the picture gallery when Elizabeth, feeling far more favorably impressed with Darcy as a result of Mrs. Reynolds' high regard, "beheld a striking resemblance of Mr. Darcy, with such a smile over the face, as she remembered to have sometimes seen, when he looked at her...." Returning to it as the group retraces its steps, "she stood before the canvas, on which he was represented, and *fixed his eyes upon herself* [emphasis added;] she thought of his regard with a deeper sentiment of gratitude than it had ever raised before...." Here we have Austen explicitly indicating that Elizabeth positions herself at the point on which Darcy's eyes are focused, modifying her sentiments about him and herself: redefining herself through his eyes (and Young attends to Lizzie's "fine dark eyes," as Darcy perceives them and appreciates her), a redefinition dependent as well on her sense of the world he occupies at Pemberley, how it reflects him and how he inhabits it. As Young cites Damasio, "we become conscious when our organisms internally construct and internally exhibit a specific kind of wordless knowledge – and our organism has been changed by an object..." This strategic scene reveals Elizabeth's recognition: "at that moment she felt, that to be mistress of Pemberley might be something!"

The book concludes with a "Coda," almost exploding with additional sources from the sciences of the mind and the brain, called "The Neurology of Narrative," in which Young collaborates with Jeffrey L. Saver, M.D. This section, she tells her reader in the introduction, was actually her starting point for her thinking about narrative: "that we think in narrative because our brains are hardwired to do so." The three main parts of her book resulted from her study of "the relations of mind and the novels" she discusses. She argues powerfully that "the novel is an aesthetic map to and experiencing of the nature of the mind-brain. The ideas and their expression of James and Damasio when set next to those of Austen, Eliot, and Hardy make

evident their connection”: a connection between a description of “the nature of mental processing” and fictional portrayals that “bring that processing to embodied, feeling, relational narrative life.”

But Young is far more ambitious here as well as exceptionally generous with her readers: she is not merely adding corroborating data from some scientific work to her own astute readings; rather, she is aiming at identifying the sources and nature of narrative, of a variety of consciousnesses, as well as reflecting on how reading a novel affects the mind-body of the reader. In doing so, she has produced an exciting interdisciplinary study.

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