PART THREE

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF HILARY PUTNAM

Compiled and Edited by
JOHN R. SHOOK

with the assistance of
HILARY PUTNAM AND JOSEPH PALENCIK
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF HILARY PUTNAM

This bibliography lists books and then shorter writings, in chronological order of their first publication. Chapters of books are accompanied by a year of first publication; those chapters lacking a year were first published in that book. Only selected reprints of shorter writings are mentioned, to clarify multiple versions. A translation of a shorter item is included if that was its first publication; any later publication in English is mentioned.

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